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I.

INTRODUCTORY

The object of statutes imposing new duties upon individuals or corporations is to provide the general public
with a protection unsupplied by the common law, or to give to
individuals undergoing a liability to injury, a remedy not
before in

existence,

or to make the common law remedy more

It is seldom that these purposes are expressed in

complete.

words, although from the construction of the different
statutes the intent is quite evident.
When the purposes of the act are riot expressed, in
determining the civil liability of the individual or corporation upon which the new duty is imposed, to the person injured by its neglect, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider the statute with care and to search for the motive or ends
which the legislature sought to accomplish.

In the process

of fixing upon the real intent of the legislative enactments
of this character, certain rules of corstruction are often

(a)
followed:
1.

Where a right is

granted by statute or exists at

common law, the enactment of a subsequent statute giving a
new remedy or prescribing a penalty or forfeiture for a violation of that right, is cumulative, and is not a substitute
for former remedies and penalties still existing, unless the
(a) Farmers Turnpike Co. v. Coventry, 10 Johns. 389.

statute indicates
old.

that the new remedy is

exclusive of the

In this case the party may pursue at his option, either

the common law remedy or the remedy given by statute, as it
is fairly inferable from the letter of the act that the old

(a)
redress is not excluded.
2.

On the other hand the words of the new statute may

exclude any remedy existing at common law,

either by implica-

(b)
tion or an express provision.

In an Indiana case it was held

that where the statute authorizes property to be taken, and
points out a specific mode for exercising the rights of eminent domain, and a particular court in which redress shall be
sought, the statutory remedy must be pursued.

This is the

general construction put by the courts upon statutes by which
land is authorized to be taken for public use under the right
of eminent domain.

The common law remedy in these cases is

superseded and the injured party must pursue the remedy given
(c)
by statute.
3.

In the third place, where no duty existed at common

law and the legislature imposes a new one, a specific remedy
being granted for its violation, the presumption is that this
remedy is exclusive and the wronged party must seek his re(d)
dress under it.
It has been held that where a statute creates
a new offense by prohibiting and making unlawful anything
(a) Treman v. Richardson, 68 IT. Y. 617; Cumberland etc. Corporation v. Hitchings, 59 Me. 206; Jarrett v. Apple, 31
Kan. 693; Carson v. Mining Co., 5 Mich. 288; Great Northern Ry. Co., v. Kennedy, 4 Exch. 417.
(b) McCormack v. Terre Haute etc. Ry. Co., 9 Ind. 283.
(c) Soulard v. St. Louis, 36 Mo. 546; Stowell v. Flagg, 11
Mass. 364; Henniker v. Contercook V. R., 29 IT. Y. 146.
(d) Comlissioners v. Bank of Findlay, 32 Ohio State 194.

which was lawful before, and provides a specific remedy for a
violation of such statute, by a particular sanction and methis

that prescribed

the statute wlhich makes the act unlawful.

Where the per-

od of proceeding,
in

thiat the only indermtnit:

formance of any duty is enjoined under penalty for its nonobservance, it is generally conceded that the recovery of
this penalty is the sole remedy, even when not made payable
(a)
to the party injured. In cases where the penalty imposed by
statute is inadequate to compel a performance, and it is evident that the duty enjoined is for the benefit of an individual, then the new remedy is held to be cumulative to the corn(b)
mon law, as where the charter of a turnpike company having
provided that any person who should cut or break down, or
otherwise destroy, any of the gates on their road, or should
dig up or carry away any earth therefrom, "or in any manner
damage the same", should forfeit and pay a fine not exceeding
fifty dollars, to be recovered in an action of trespass on
the case, to the use of the corporation in the name of their
treasurer;

it was held, that if this provision included the

case of an obstruction to the road, by means of placing a
large rock or building thereon, it was not intended to take
away any common law remedies, for such injury or obstruction.

(a) Almy v. Harris, 5 Johns 175; Flynn v. Canton Co., 40 Md.
312; Moore v. Gadsen, 93 11. Y. 12.
(b) Salem Turnpike Co. v. Hayes, 5 Cush. 458.

II.

DUTIES IMPOSED MERELY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PUBLIC.

In order that a complainant can recover for negligence he must show that he is within the class for whose benefit the statute was passed and that the legislature did not
create a purely public duty.

This distinction is often ob-

served in the water supply cases where a municipal corporation has made a contract with a water-works company to supply
the city with water.

In this case where there is no special

contract on behalf of the complainant, he could not maintain
an action against the water company for breach, as the statute
did not apply to him individually, but to the municipality.
(a)
In the familiar English case where a statute bound the company
to maintain fire plugs and to furnish a sufficient supply of
water to keep the pipes charged with water of a certain pressure, so as to reach the highest story in the highest house in
the area supplied, for use in case of fire, without compensation, and imposed a fine in case of neglect, the court held
that the defendants were not liable for the insufficient suDply of water at the fire.

This act was considered in the

nature of a private legislative bargain and did not create a
duty to the complainant.

Even if a public duty were created

by the statute and special damage ensue, it does not necessarily follow that an individual cause of action will arise.
(a) Atkinson v. Newcastle & Gatestead Water Co., L.
Div. 441.

R.

2 Exch.

It would seem that the opposite doctrine is held in

(a)
the Kentucky case, but it should be observed that there an
express contract existed between the lumber company and the
water supply company, by which for the certain price paid for
two hydrants upon the premises of the former, it was agreed
to furnish the water directly.

It

is, however, the general

doctrine, deducible from the opinions in the cases that the
water-works company is not liable for the inadequate supply
of water for fire purposes under a contract with a city or
corporation to furnish water for the extinguishment of fire,
in the absence of a contract between the company and the property owner.

This rule has been applied even where the water

company agreed with the corporation to indemnify it against
all claims made by or on behalf of any citizen or resident
and may have stipulated that the action might be brought in

(b)
the property owner's name.

Here the plaintiff in supporting

his contention referred to the Kentucky case (supra) but the
court in its opinion distinguished the two cases, as above,
in that no privity of contract existed in the former, while
in the Kentucky case there was a certain fixed rent to be
paid the water company by the complainant.

The mere fact

that a property owner and a stranger to the contract between
a water company and a municipality secures some benefit from
the agreement in the protection of his property in common
with all other persons having property similarly situated,
does not make him a party to the contract or create any priv(a) Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah W. S. Co., 89 Ky. 340.
(b) Mott v. Cherryvale W. & M. Co., 48 Kan. 15.

(a)
ity between himself and such company.
While it is generally conceded that, in the absence
of statutory obligation, no liability rests on the owner of a

lot abutting a street, to repair or maintain in safe condition the street or sidewalk, it is insisted by authorities
that failure, for example, to remove snow or ice, as required
by ordinance, is a breach of duty to the public from which an
(b)
individual action does not arise. In Michigan it is held
that an ordinance requiring all persons to keep their sidewalks free from ice imposes a purely public duty and persons
injured by slipping on the ice cannot bring private actions
against the owners of the premises.

Breaches of public duty

must be punished in some form of public prosecution, and not
by way of individual recovery of damages; although when the
duty is imposed for the protection and benefit of a particular individual or class, as well as for that of the public,
there may be an individual right of action for individual
injury, as well as a public prosecution.
The general rule seems to be that an action by a
private individual may be sustained against the municipality
for negligence in the breach of a charter requiring the municipality to keep its streets and sidewalks in a good and safe
condition.

Chief Justice Ruger in the case of the City of

(a) Davis v. Clinton Water Co., 54 Iowa 59; Ferris v. Carson
Water Co., 16 Nev. 44; Britton v. Green Bay etc. Water
Co. 81 Wis. 48; Beck v. Kittaning Water Co., (Pa. 1887)
ll At. Rep. 300; Nickerson v. Bridgeport etc. Co., 46
Conn. 24; Fowler v. Athens City Water Co., 83 Ga. 219;
Foster v. Lookout Water Co., 3 Lea (Tenn.) 42; Eaton v.
Fairbury Water Co., 37 Neb. 546; Fitch v. Seymour Water
Co., (Ind.'1894) 37 N. E. Rep. 982.
(b) Taylor v. L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co., 45 Mich. 74.

(a)
Rochester v. Campbell et al., has laid down seven propositions
concerning actions of this character.
"1.

That municipal corporations in this state are charg-

ed with the care, custody and control of the streets and highways within their limits, and the duty, primarily, rests upon
them to keep such streets and highways in repair, so that
they may be safely travelled upon by all having occasion to
use them, and this duty is based upon contract" by the charter.
"2.

That such corporations are liable for damages aris-

ing from a neglect to perform this duty, in an action ex delicto, to persons lawfully using such streets and sidewalks,
notwithstanding a duty to repair is also imposed upon the
property owners in front of whose premises the injury occurred.
"3.

If a municipal corporation has been compelled to pay

a judgment for damages recovered by a traveller for injuries
sustained from a defect or obstruction in one of its highways,
which defect or obstruction was created by the wilful act or
negligence of a third person, it may maintain an action
against such third person for reimbursement, and the rule is
the same when it has been paid on undoubted liability without
suit."
"4.

So also, if the municipality has provided by con-

tract with third persons for keeping its streets in repair
and has been, through a ne lect by such party to perform his
contract, subjected to damages at the suit of an injured party, it may recover from such party the sum which it has been
(a)

compelled to pay."
"5.

The measure of damages in such cases is the loss

sustained by the injured party, and paid by the municipality
with such incidental expenses as

a:ry have been incurred in

defending the action."
"6.

That no obligation to repair streets or sidewalks

rests upon the lot owners at common law, but the duty to do
so,

if any, arises out of the statutory obligations imposed

by the state or municipality upon them."
7.

A corporation may defend the suit in case the third

person who is liable to reimiburse the corporation refuse,
and the third person may be charged with the expenses of the
suit and is bound by the result.
thorities upon the subject.

This case cites many au-

III.

DUTIES VTHICH IIT THEIR NATURE
ARE A PROTECTION TO PRIVATE RIGHTS AS WELL.

The statute passed by the legislature or ordinance
of the municipality may create not only a public duty, but
also a duty to private persons, a breach of which may be
actionable negligence.

However, an individual may not be

able to recover, because 1e is not of the class of persons
for whose benefit the statute was designed.

In this class

may be included the acts of servants in the performance of
their duties, causing injury to their fellow-servants.

It

(a)
has been held that an ordinance requiring a railroad company
to keep flagmen at street crossings was not intended for the
protection of the company's employees and creates no duty to
then,

the violation of which resulting in damages, is action-

able negligence.

The law on this subject was laid down in

the case of Woodruff v. Brown, (136 Ind.

43), where it was

held that the owner of a building in a populous city does not
owe it as a duty at common law, independent of any statute or
ordinance, to keep such building safe for firemen or other
officers who in a contingency may enter the same under a license conferred by law, but such a duty may be imposed either
by statute or by ordinance.

The ordinance requiring the ab-

solute safety of a building or other structure applies only
(a) Kansas City St. L. & 1. R. Co. v. Kirksey, 60 Fed. 999.

to citizens in them on business aid not to a fireman going
there to extinguish a fire, for as to him the owner of a
building is not supposed or held to owe a duty of maintaining
his property in a safe condition, for he has not anticipated
or invited his presence, although he is not a trespasser.
Another case defining the class of persons entitled
to the benefit of the duty created by ordinance is that of
Gibson v. Leonard, (143 Ill. 182), where it was held that the
owner of land and of buildings, assumes no duty to discover
what persons are on his premises by permission and as a mere
licensee, except that he will refrain from wilful or affirmative acts which are injurious.

Therefore a person who enters

on premises of another, by permission only, without any enticement, allurement or inducement being held out to him by
the owner or occupier, cannot recover damages for injuries
caused by obstructions or pitfalls.

In this case the members

of a fire patrol forced open the door of a building then on
fire and entered the main floor and basement and while using
an elevator, the rope broke and the counterweight which was
not suitably secured in its place, fell and injured one of
them.

The owner of the building was not present and did

nothing to induce the entry.

The court held that he was not

liable to the party injured, although the elevator and its
appliances were not safely constructed and maintained, notwithstandig an ordinance of the city provided that, "in
every factory, workshop, or other place or structure where
machinery is employed, the belting, shaftings, gearing, eleva-

14
tors and every other thing when so located as to endanger the
lives and limbs of those enployed therein while in the discharge of their duties, shall be, so far as is practicable,
so covered or guarded against any injury to such employes."
This ordinance was intended for the protection of employees,
only, and because one, not an employee, but a mere licensee,
was injured in consequence of the neglect of the owner of the
elevator to maintain it properly guarded, could not recover
damages on account of such neglect.
VPhere a statute imposes a duty upon a citizen or
corporation for the special benefit of certain persons or
classes of persons; anyone having a special interest in the
performance thereof, may sue for any breach occurring, which
has been the proximate cause of his injury.

The tenement

house cases are illustrative of this branch of the subject,

(a)
as where an absolute duty is imposed by ordinance upon the
owners of tenament houses making it obligatory upon them to
maintain proper egress to the roof of their buildings and in
addition sufficient fire escapes, approved by an official inspector; this duty has been held for the benefit of the tenants who in case of a breach causing damage to them may maintain an action against their landlord.
One of the most common classes of cases in which it
is necessary to decide for whose benefit the statutory duty
was imposed, arises under the enactment by the legislatures
of the different states, of statutes making it obligatory
(a) Tilby v.

!ulledy, 78 N. Y. 310-

15
upon approaching trains to sound signals at public crossings.
The statutes in the several states differ very little, their
main requirement consisting in that a bell or whistle must be
rung or blown at a certain distance before the crossing is
reached, and until the engine has passed that crossing.
These statutes give the person injured a right of action
against the railroadcompany guilty of the breach of its
utory duty.

stat-

In order that the plaintiff may maintain his

action he must show that he has complied with the essential
conditions which bring him within the class for whose benefit
the act was passed.

First, it is the general rule that only

those persons who are lawfully upon the track of the defendant railroad company are of this class, thus excluding tres-

(a)
passers.

It has been decided that a private crossing of which

the railroad company had knowledge, and which is used with
its consent by men and teams in drawing logs, is not a railroad crossing within the meaning of a provision of the laws
of Michigan, at which signals by bell and whistle must be
given.

It was said that the failure to give warning of an

approaching train at such a crossing is not negligence as a
matter of law.

If one knows that the warning is habitually

omitted at such a crossing, he cannot act upon an agreement
by a railroad company to give a warning.

:ut in this case

the failure to give signals required by law at a railroad
crossing rendered the company liable for injuries in consequence thereof, to a person lawfully crossing the track in
(a) Sanborn v. Detroit B. C. &i A. R. R. 91 :ich. 538.

that vicinity, relying upon the performance by the railroad

(a)
In 7akefield v.

company of its duty to give such signals.
Connecticut 2-P.

P.

F. Co. (37 Vt. 330),

it is said tiat the

statutory duty to give signals on the approach of a train to
a crossing exists in reference "to all persons who being lawfully at or in the vicinity of the crossing may be subjected
to accident and injury by the passing of engines at that
place."

The facts of this case were that a traveller on a

highway had passed the crossing before the train reached it,
and his horses becoming frightened had turned about and dashed in front of the engine, causing the injury complained of.

(b)
The courts of Georgia hold that although statutory
signals are intended primarily for the protection of persons
crossing the track and not for those walking along it, a
failure to perform this duty imposed by statute, is evidence
of negligence to be considered by the jury.

On the other

hand, in many other instances the courts have said that such
statutory signals are intended only for the benefit of persons crossing, or at least travelling, upon the highway near
the crossing.

This language, however, seems to have been

confined usually to cases in which stock in fields received
damage, or concerning persons trespassing upon the railroad
track, or at some place where their presence could not have
been anticipated by the engineer or person in charge of the

(c)

approaching train.

The opposite doctrine seems to have been

(a) Cahill v. Cincinnati N. 0.
T. P. R. Co., 13 Ky. L. R. 714
(b) Central R. Co. v. Ranford, 82 Ga. 400.
(c) Nashville C. & St. L. R. Co. v. 7embree, 85 Ala. 481.

(a)
sustained in Georgia, where a horse was killed on a railroad
track not far from a crossing, and it was held that failure
to give the required signal was proper to be considered in
determining the company's negligence.
It is almost universally held that persons using
the railway track as a path and walking thereon are not entitled to the benefit of the statutory signals of trains approaching a crossing.

This language is also applicable to

(b)

trespassers upon the other property of the railroad company.
Under the general rule of law, that one who enters
the service of another, takes upon himself the ordinary risks
of the negligent acts of his fellow-servants in the course of
their employment, a servant of a railroad company is not entitled to the benefit of a statute requiring signals of the
Cc)
approach of a train to a crossing.
Another question arises in the cases where a highway is parallel to and near the track of a railway, although
not crossing it at that particular point.

In these cases the

question to be considered is whether the traveller upon the
highway alleged to have been injured by the failure of the
company to sound the statutory signal, can sustain his claim.

(d)
In studying one case, it might seem that he would be unable
to do so, but upon further consideration we find that the injured party was travelling upon the highway more than a quar(a) 7Testern
A. R
P. Co. v. Jones,65 Ga. 631.
(b) Shackleford v. Louisville & ',. R. Co., 84 Ky. 43; .picer
v. Chesapeake & 0. R. R., 34 7. 7a. 514; 0'ionnell v.
Providence & V. R. Co., 6 R. 1. 215; iLlwood v. l. Y. C. &
II.R. R. R. Co., 4 Yun. 808.
(c) Randall v. B.
0.. R. Co., 109 U. S. 478.
(d) East Tenn. V.
7. R.
R: Co. v. Feathers, 10 La. 103.
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ter of a mile from the crossing.

In these facts it was held

by the court that the plaintiff had no right to depend upon
the signal, for at the place of the injury the railroad company was under no statutory obligation to give a warning.
The general rule seems to be that the fright of a horse being
driven on a highway near a railroad crossing, which was caused by the approach of a train without giving the signals required by law, renders the railroad company liable for the
(a)
resulting damages, although there was no collision.
In determining the question, at what crossings the
duty is imposed upon the railroads to give warning of their
coming trains, it should be remembered that something more
than a mere dedication to the public of an easement is necossary.

The street must be travelled and known to be a pub-

lic street as well as a public right.

There the railroad

company has for years recognized and treated a certain place
as a public crossing and the public have also used it as such,
the duty of sounding signals at t at point is

laid upon the

company operating its trains over that road, and passing such

(b)
crossing.

Cc)
In Alabama the courts have held that where a high-

way crosses a railroad by a bridge, it is not necessary that
the train sound the customary signal used at public crossings,
(d)
but on the contrary in N'ew York, a crossing at which a railroad is elevated above the highway over which it passes upon
(a) Pollock v. Eastern R. Co., 124 Mass. 158; Voak v. !Iorthern etc. R. Co., 75 11. Y. 320.
(b) Lissouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lee, 70 Tex. 496.
(c) Louisville C. i.. R. Co. v. Hall, 87 Ala. 708.
(d) People v. N. Y. C. P H. R. R. R. Co., 25 Barb. 199.

a bridge,

so as to prevent danger of collisions between trav-

ellers on the highway, and the trains upon the track, is within the statute requiring signals at a railroad crossing, as
the danger of frightening teams as well as of actual collision, was intended to have been guarded against.

1he same
(a)
rule has been sustained by the courts of Pennsylvania. Failure to give signals of a train at a private crossing is not

(b)
generally within the rule.
Another instance in which the legislatures of many
states have imposed a nev dutyr upon a railroad corporation,
is that requiring them to fence their tracks.
may not point out,

These statutes

in terms, what shall be the rights on one

side, and the liabilities on the other, if the duty is neglected, and it is then incumbent upon the courts to determine
the relation of both.
duty is

It is important to decide whether the

imposed upon public grounds exclusively and if not,

what persons or classes of persons are within its intended
protection.

In the absence of statutory requirements, as at

common law, railroad companies were under no obligation to
fence their tracks, so as to prevent cattle straying thereon,
in order to protect both, the cattle from injury and the
trains from danger of wreck.

Under these circumstances, the

owners of cattle injured upon the tracks of a railroad would

(c)

have no remedy against the corporation, while they might even
be responsible for any injury caused to the property of the
(a) Penn. R. Co. v. Barnett, 59 Pa. 259.
(b) Hucker v. R. Co., 7 Ky. L. Rep. 761.
(c) St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Ferguson, 57 Ark. 16.

railroad, if negligence could be imputed to the owners in

(a)
suffering the cattle to stray.

At the present time it is

quite generally required by statute that railroad companies
shall

fence their tracks.

The purposes of this obligation,

are as mentioned above, two-fold, in that they are made,
first, in order to protect the persons of the travelling public, who are in great danger when cattle are allowed upon
the track, and, second, to protect the cattle themselves;
ordinarily accomplished by making the railroad companies responsible for animals injured upon their unfenced tracks.

(a) Railroad Co. v. Skinner, 19 Pa. St. 298.

IV.

CONCERNING THE VIOLATION OF THE DUTY IMPOSED
AND ITS CAUSAL RELATION TO THE HARM SUFFERED.

The legislature having enacted statutes defining
the precautions under which certain acts must be performed,
have exonerated an individual or corporation, complying with
those precautions.

In these cases no extra-statutory care

need be used if the letter of the law is strictly complied
(a)
with. Where a railroad company was compelled by statute to
place upon some part of every locomotive engine used by such
company, a bell of a weight of not less than thirty pounds or
a steam whistle, which can be heard distinctly at a distance
of at least three hundred yards, and shall cause such a bell
to be rung or steam whistle to be blown at a distance of at
least three hundred yards from highway crossings, until such
crossings are passed; compliance with these precautions exonerates the railroad company from any further duty.

If there

is a bell upon the engine of the statutory weight and it is
rung in the marner required, as far as the giving of an audible signal before reaching a public crossing is regarded, the
company has performed its duty, whether the signal so given
is heard and heeded or not by a person crossing the railroad
track on the highway.
In the decided cases is found considerable judicial
(a) New York etc. R. Co. v. Leaman, 54 N. J. L. 202.
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dicta in favor of the views that a prescribed statutory duty
is only cumulative, by which is meant, that, aside from the
statute,

the common law imposes a duty upon the managers

of

any dangerous machine to employ such precautions against harm
to others as is

co-mmensurate with the danger.

Questions

touching the duty of extra-statutory care have arisen in
railroad cases where a crossing has been said to possess unusual features of danger.

In such cases it has been held that

t:-e company is

under a duty to maintain flagmen or gates as

the crossing.

But this duty arises only when this peculiarly

dangerous feature is in consequence of the act of the company
itself in coulstructing its road or buildings.
In some cases, compliance with the statutory duty
may not exclude a common law duty where

ordinary care would

comn-and that those in charge of a train shall give additional
warning or take further precautions in conducting the train
than those imposed upon them by the legislature.

It is not al-

ways sufficient to satisfy the requirements of ordinary care
that the statutory signals alone, upon approaching a crossing,
should be complied with.

In reaching the proper conclusion

the jury will take into consideration all
cumstances

surroundizg the case,

te

facts and cir-

before deciding

(a)

orhether the

demands of ordinary care have been complied with.

(b)
In an Alabama case the court said that although
running a train by the railroad company at a greater rate of
speed than six miles an hour in a city was per se negligence,
(a) Atkinson etc. R. Co. v. Hague, 54 Kan. 284.
(b) Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Philips, 70 Mdiss. 14.

a statute prohibiting the same, running a train through a
city at a less speed was not always lawful, for circumstances
may arise, and often do, where a rate less than six miles per
hour is grossly negligent.

If but for the statute negligence

would be imputed to the company, it cannot be absolved from

(a)
the charge of negligence by the statute.

Although a new duty

may be imposed by statute upon an individual, he is not relieved thereby of his common law duty in the conduct of his
lawful business, to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury
(b)
to others. Nor can an employee waive the performance of certain requirements of statutes making it criminal for an employer to use machinery without the statutory guards.

These

statutes are passed for public policy and no employee has the
power to excuse their performance.

Of course, parties may

waive statutory provisions made for their own personal benefit, for public policy has no particular interest in such
(c)
transactions. The existence of a custom in a certain place
will not excuse the performance of a statutory duty.

Where a

(d)
custom was prevalent of violating the duty to exhibit lights
on a boat moving at night, the failure to perform this statutory obligation will not thereby be excused, and a railway
company violating an ordinance by running its trains at a
rate of speed faster than that allowed by the terms of such
ordinance, cannot set up as a defense that the officers and
(a) Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Spiker, 134 Ind. 380
(b) McGill v. Pittsburg
Ve. R. Co., 152 Pa. St. 331; McDonald v. International etc. R. Co., 86 Tex. 1; Durgin v.
Kennett, 29 At. Rep. 414.
(c) Simpson v. N. Y. Rubber Co., 80 Hun. 415.
(d) Billings v. Breinig, 45 Mich. 65.
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citizens of the city had never enforced the ordinance, although

(a)

it had been enacted many years before.

(a) Cleveland C. C. & I. R. Co. v. Harrington, 131 Ind.

426.

V.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF ONE SEEKING REDRESS
UPON THE GROUND OF STATUTORY LIABILITY.

In proving negligence it is necessary to show that
a specific duty placed upon the party causing the injury has
not been performed, before any action will arise.

After this

duty has been established it is requisite that the plaintiff
point out that he is uithin the class of persons for whose
benefit the duty was imposed, for a duty owing to the general
public does not establish a cause of action until some certain person is placed in a position giving him the right of
insisting upon the compliance of the party charged with the
breach, with the terms of the act raising the statutory duty.
Having shown these facts it is further necessary that the
party suffering the harm, prove the absence of any negligence
on his part which may have contributed toward the injury, no
one being allowed to recover damages, where, from the circumstances, it is evident that but for his own contributory negligence no injury would have occurred.

Therefore, where the

injury complained of is brought about by the concurring negligence of both parties, the courts apply the theory that no
person can establish the foundation for an action for damages
suffered by reason of his own fault.

(a)
Where "on July 4, 1891, while the plaintiff was
(a)

Evans v. Waite,

83 Wis.

286.

lawfully riding on horseback on the public highway, in company with the defendant, the defendant being then and there
armed with a revolver loaded with powder and ball, negligently and carelessly discharged the said revolver so that the
ball therefrom struck the plaintiff in the hip, and passed on
through the flesh into his thigh, where it became lodged",causing a dangerous wound, the court held that the defendant
was liable to the plaintiff for the injury, because the defendant was a minor and carried a revolver in violation of
statute.

The court held that, because the statute was vio-

lated, the question of the plaintiff's negligence in being
with the defendant and consenting to his unlawful carrying
of the revolver, was not of importance, and did not charge
him with contributory negligence.
But it has been held that the doctrine of contributory negligence applies to actions arising from the neglect

(a)
of statutory duty, where a plaintiff brings an action against
a railroad company for injury caused by the failure of the
company either to erect or to maintain fences on the line of
its road, as in other actions for negligence, contributory

(b)
negligence is a defense. As neither the consent nor other
(c)
conduct will justify the disregard of a positive statutory
duty, the action of the individual seeking redress must
amount to contributory negligence before such a breach of
duty will be construed as a license in the form of a justi(a) Curry v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 43 Wis. 665.
(b) Knott v. Wagner, 16 Lea. 481.
(c) San Antonio etc. Co. v. Peterson (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S.
W. 969; Thomas v. Quartermaine, 56 L. J. Q. B. 340.

fication, of the violation.

(a)

In a California case, the doctrine that one who,
aware of an obstruction in a street, negligently falls over
it, is barred from establishing an action upon an ordinance
of the city requiring a lighted lantern to be maintained at
such a place, is laid down.

This was an action to recover

damages for a personal injury arising from falling over a
rail left by a street railroad company upon the sidewalk,
which the railroad company expected to use in the construction
of the road, where the plaintiff, knowing the presence of the
rail and having seen others fall over it, the court said that
the contributory negligence as a matter of law barred the recovery..

(a) Davis v. California St. C. R. Co., 105 Cal. 131.

VI.

WHETHER A BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY IS NEGLIGENCE
AS A MATTER OF LAW, OR MERELY EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE.

A difference of opinion exists in the authorities
as to whether the mere breach of the statutory duty constitutes
negligence per se, or whether the breach of duty must be taken along with other circumstances and left to the jury and is
(a)
not negligence as a matter of law. In Indiana it has been
decided that in an action against a railroad company to recover damages for a personal injury, caused by the failure of
the company to comply with certain statutory duties, a general averment that the injury happened without the fault or
negligence of the plaintiff is sufficient to sustain his
claim.

It is not necessary to set out affirmatively all the

precautions taken to avoid the injury.

It is negligence per

se to run a train of cars in violation of a city ordinance,
and if anyone is injured in consequence of such negligence,
without being himself guilty of contributing to the cause of
(b)
the harm suffered, he may recover damages for such injury.
As regards the question of the proximate cause of
the harm done, it has been held that it is not necessary that
the cause should be near in point of time.

In the case where

(a) Pennsylvania Co. v. Horton, 132 Ind. 189.
(b) Schlereth v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 115 Mo. 87; Platte &
Denver C. & M. Co. v. Dowell, 17 Col. 376.
(c) Salisbury v. Herchenroder, 106 Mass. 458.
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an ordinance forbids any person to suspend a sign over a public

street and a person does so in direct violation of the

ordinance, using ordinary precautions in so doing, and an
extraordinary wind-storm in the nature of an act of God,
blows the sign from its fastenings and in its fall a bolt
from which the wire holding the sign was suspended, injured
the plaintiff, the court was of the opinion that although a
natural cause or "actus major", contributes with the unlawful
act of a person to inflict an injury, the defendant was not
relieved from liability to the person suffering the injury.
The cause- of the harm was not so remote as to excuse the defendant from liability for his breach of duty imposed by the
city ordinance.

(a)
It is held in New York that where a druggist makes
a sale to a person of a poisonous substance which he fails to
label as such,

the druggist

is

guilty of negligence per se,

but if the druggist explains to the purchaser the dangerous
qualities of the drug, he is relieved from liability.
druggist

The

in this case was under a statutory duty to label the

liquid sold, "poison", and under ordinary circumstances a
failure to do so is negligence as a matter of law, but here
the fact that he warned the buyer of the inherently fatal effects of the poison, absolved him from that duty.

In another

(b),
case arising under the violation of an ordinance, in which it
was proved that the plaintiff was injured by a runaway horse
(a) Wohlfahrt v. Beckert, 92 N. Y. 490.
(b) Siemers v. Eisen, 54 Cal. 418.
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left unfastened in a public street, contrary to the provisions
of a city ordinance, t:-e court decided t!lat it was not necessary to leave the question of negligence to the jury, but
on the contrary instructed them that the evidence established
it,

boldin.:

that where any person failed to perform a duty,

imposed upon him by statute, or other legal authoritr, the
neglect of duty constituted negligence itself and not evidence of negligence.
Numerous authorities, on the other hand, nold that
a breach of the statutory duty is not negligence per se, but
merely evidence of negligence which is to be weighed in connection with all the circumstances of each case.

The ques-

(a)
tion arose in an action for damages resulting from the failure of the defendant to comply with a municipal ordinance,
which forbade any person to put ashes into a wooden ash barrel.

As it is manifestly not negligent at all times and under

all circumstances to putf ashes into a wooden ash barrel, for
instance cold ashes, the court held that it was not negligence
as a matter of law, but merely a question of fact in each
case.

The court said, among other things, "City ordinances

are necessarily made general, and impose duties which in a
given case may be of no special importance.

It is quite

possible that under certain circumstances, and in various
surroundings, it is in no way dangerous to put ashes in wooden barrels

.

.

.

Whether the use of them is culpably negli-

gent in a given case must usually be a question of fact to be
(a) Cook v. Johnston, 58 Mich. 437.

determined by the jury on the facts and not by the court."
This question is further discussed in a case aris-

(a)
ing in the

ice cutting business on Lake Champlain in an act-

ion on the case to recover the value of a pair of horses
drowned.

It was alleged and proved that the defendant had

not complied with a statute of Vermont requiring persons
the ice
cut,
ings.

in

industry to maintain suitable guards about the holes

to prevent persons or teams from falling into such openA team belonging to the plaintiff ran away and dashed

into such an opening, which had been left unguarded, and were
drowned.

The charge to the jury in the lower court was, in

substance, that

if the guards would not have prevented the

accident, the plaintiff could not recover, although he was
not guilty of contributory negligence, but was in the exercise of ordinary care and the defendant was negligent; however, if the team would have been stopped by a proper guard
or would have been turned away by its presence, the plaintiff
could recover for their loss.

The court in deciding the case

was of the opinion that negligence must not only be shown by
the evidence, but must also be proved that it was the proximate cause of the injury complained of.
left to the jury

The question was

to decide whether suitable guards at that

place would have prevented the disaster.

(b)
In an action against a railroad company for damages
for personal injury, the court decided that proof of the vio(a) Sowles v. Moore, 65 Vt. 323; 26 At. Rep. 629.
(b) Rainey v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 68 Hun. 495.

lation of a city ordinance by the railroad company does not
establish a cause of action against the violator, but on the
contrary is evidence bearing upon the question of negligence.
The facts of tuis case were that a city ordinance required a
railroad company to maintain gates at its grade crossings and
to attend them at all times when trains were passing and to
close them at least one minute before a locomotive passed.
The cause was to recover damages resulting from a person's
death alleged to have been due to
to close the gates;

the failure

of the company

it was held this circumstance was insuf-

ficient to sustain a judgnent on the ground of negligence,
unless other circumstances were proved making it culpable
negligence.

(a)
In New York it is said to be an open question whether the violation of a municipal ordinance
se, and it is held that

is negligence per

the city ordinance should be submit-

ted to the jury with the other evidence as bearing upon the
question, but not conclusively proving it.

The result of the

decisions, therefore, is that the violation of the ordinance
is some evidence of negligence, but not necessarily negli-

(b)
gence itself.

(a) Massoth v. D. & H. Canal Co., 64 N. Y. 524.
(b) Knupple v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84 N. Y. 491; Hanlon v.
S. Boston H. C. Co., 129 Mass. 310; Hall v. Ripley, 119
Mass. 135.

